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BosniaÕs fate and stability evoke growing con-
cerns among observers of the Balkan political
scene. Out of three goals the international com-
munity set themselves in Dayton Ð the assuran-
ce of security, the reconstruction of infrastructu-
re damaged as a result of the conflict and the
creation of a multinational, democratic society Ð
only the first of these appears to have been
achieved. This is despite the failure to capture
war criminals, the occurrence of explosive local
incidents, and the need to maintain significant
international peace and police forces eight years
after conflict resolution1. The lack of success in
achieving the subsequent two goals means that
doubts about BosniaÕs future tend to arise incre-
asingly more often, concerning two significant,
related issues: perspectives for stabilisation, the
reconstruction and building of a democratic so-
ciety, the stability of BosniaÕs2 political status
and, indirectly Ð the permanency of its borders.
If the plans for social and economic recontruc-
tion falter, this might result in making Bosnia in
the further future the hotbed for many a threats,
starting from illegal immigration, drugs and
guns transit, and ending up with the springing
of the radical islamist ideologies, terrorist mili-
tias, etc. This essay concentrates on the second
of these issues. This is also due to the fact that,
should worldwide public opinion recognise that
Bosnia, after eight years, has become nothing
other than a Òcommon market executing a pom-
pous foreign policyÓ, it would be necessary to re-
view the hitherto policy Ð the route of the bor-
ders would then be considered one of the fastest
and most commonly questioned elements.
The status of Bosnia and Herz e-
g o v i n a Õ s legal and government
system: hidden traps 
B o s n i a Õ s parliament announced sovere i g n t y
back in October 1991. In spite of this, the four-
year conflict, having the characteristics of a do-
mestic war, as well as those of an international
dispute, did not allow for the elaboration of per-
manently operating constitutional mechanisms.
BosniaÕs government system is regulated by the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bo-
snia and Herzegovina (GFAP) entered into in De-
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cember 1995 at the Dayton military base, hence
the sometimes-used title ÒDayton PactÓ or the
more widely used, ÒDayton Peace AgreementÓ.
Another derivative of this name is ÒDayton con-
stitutionÓ, used in connection with the basic law
constituting the primary element of the Peace
Agreement. Furthermore, these days, it is not ra-
re to hear opinions postulating the granting of
subsequent amendments or a completely new
constitutional formula3.
The basic law, drawn up in extremely atypical
circumstances (under the conditions of a Òweak
cease-fireÓ, with the decisive participation of fo-
reign experts, later ratified by the parliaments),
was intended as a compromise that could be ac-
cepted by the parties in conflict with completely
different political aims: for the Bosnians, this
was to maintain a unitary state, whilst for the
Serbs and Croats Ð in the maximum version, this
was the annexation of controlled land to the
Òmother stateÓ and the creation of a ÒGreat Ser-
bia/CroatiaÓ, in the minimum version, however
Ð maintaining the highest possible level of auto-
nomy. As a result, the actual basic law is deeply
incoherent in such a fundamental matter as the
concept of a state. The very essence of contradic-
tion is the fact that the Dayton constitution de
facto acknowledges the legality of the existence
(and, subsequently, the rise) of the Republic of
Serbia. This is despite the fact that, at the level
of values and goals announced, it declares its op-
position to Òethnic self-determinationÓ values
and ethnic cleansing, which enabled the forma-
tion of the RS. In other words, due to the politi-
cal and military circumstances under which it
was formed, this constitution contains elements
of an appeasement that does not enjoy a very
good reputation in European history: it accepts
territorial acquisitions carried out with the vio-
lation of law due to the impossibility of oppo-
sing them in the name of reaching a compromi-
se4. At the same time, however, Bosnian Serbs
still have grounds to perceive the compromise
with Dayton as being imposed on them, hence
the existence of the RS, with its extensive auto-
nomy, as superior and primary in relation to that
compromise.
It is also worth noting that Ð no matter how Bo-
sniaÕs constitution is formally superior in rela-
tion to the basic laws of both ÒentitiesÓ Ð both
these constitutions, accepted prior to the si-
gning of the Peace Agreement in Dayton, are va-
lid despite the fact they have maintained provi-
sions referring to the concept of individual inde-
pendence and state hoods5.
Key elements making BosniaÕs c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
provisions so exceptional (as, let us add imprac-
tical) consist in: 
A. Acknowledging that three Òconstitutional na-
tionsÓ exist on B&H territory and that they sho-
uld be guaranteed the maximum protection of
their rights everywhere, where they form a mi-
nority. The maximum possible development of
such institutions, proportional representation,
a division of standards and the veto mechanism
serve this purpose.
B. A partial acceptance of the status quo from
autumn 1995 (a consequence of the four-year
conflict) and, as a result, acknowledgement of
the fact that the Bosnian nation is formed by
two ÒentitiesÓ or ÒmembersÓ (Serb/Cro a t / B o-
snian entiteti): the Serbian Republic in Bosnia
(RS) and the Muslim-Croat Federation (MCF), in-
ternally divided into ÒnationalÓ cantons. These
entities are not states as understood by interna-
tional law. However, from the moment the Day-
ton constitution was signed, they have mainta-
ined a series of their own prerogatives, inclu-
ding separate armed and stabilisation forces,
special forces, separate budgets and, to a certain
degree, also separate legislature and the right to
maintain Òspecial relationsÓ with neighbouring
countries6. Finally, they have separate media (te-
levision); they also have their own parliaments.
The federal state (Bosnia and Herzegovina) ma-
inly administers foreign policy and some budge-
tary and legislative authorisations, realised thro-
ugh the intermediary of the nationwide parlia-
ment. There is also a common currency (initially
known as konvertibilna marka, equal to 1 DM
and, as of 2002 Ð 1 euro) and a common market
(lack of internal customs barriers). 
C. An unusually wide scope of authorisations
has been granted to the UN High Commissioner,
appointed by Annex 10 to the GFAP; the Com-
missioner is authorised, among other tasks, to:
nullify parliamentary and presidential election
results, dismiss persons elected and appointed
to higher positions in the state, and display a po-
sitive legislative initiative. Fu r t h e r m o re, the
High Commissioner holds the right to indepen-
dently construct his mandate (Art. V): ÒWe know
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what weÕre not allowed to doÓ Ð one diplomat
commented on the situation7. The widely deve-
loped authorisations of the head of NATO Stabi-
lisation Forces (SFOR) are also contained in the
GFAP, as are those of OBWE representatives au-
thorised to supervise elections. One can often
hear the opinion that Bosnia differs from the
classic protectorate formula through the Òdemo-
cratic decorumÓ and the intentions of the pro-
moters of constitutional provisions; however,
practice enables one to talk about a Òpara-pro-
tectorateÓ. The paradox of the Bosnian constitu-
tion is not the last; the most democratic solu-
tions in the history of this country have simulta-
neously contributed to the development of
a Òculture of dependencyÓ and convincing politi-
cal elites of the impossibility of influencing the
countryÕs state of affairs. Just in recent years,
the High Commissioner has made decisions re-
garding key issues8 such as: 
Ð dissolving the parliament of the Republic of
Serbia in 1998;
Ð dismissing the RSÕs president, Nikola Poplasen,
in March 1999; 
Ð settling the status of the controversial Brcko
enclave in August 1999; 
Ð forbidding the representatives of a dozen or so
political parties to participate in subsequent
elections in 2000;
Ð nominating judges to the Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Tribunal (last in May 2002); 
Ð imposing common Ònational symbolsÓ for all
of Bosnia on political elites of the RS and the
MCF (flag, emblem, national anthem9, identity
cards and vehicle registration plates), which we-
re supposed to become the corner stone for the
new identity10.
The scale of resistance of the local elites towards
imposed changes is proven by the fact that the
process of revising one phrase of the constitu-
tion took more than two years. Debates on this
topic began in July 2000 when the Constitutio-
nal Tribunal in Sarajevo recognised that laws
should contain provisions acknowledging that
all three nations constituting B&H (Bosnians,
Serbs and Croats) have equal rights in all of Bo-
snia. The recommended amendments would gu-
arantee a larger representation of Serbs within
the goverment of the B&H Federation, as well as
of Muslims and Croats in the RS authorities: ho-
wever, in April 2002, following the acceptance of
the required amendments by the parliaments of
both ÒentitiesÓ, UN High Commissioner to Bo-
snia, Wolfgang Petritsch and US Ambassador
Clifford Bond, decided that further steps should
be taken. 
A description of ÒcentrifugalÓ
t e n d e n c i e s
During the first years that the Dayton Peace
Agreement was in operation, centrifugal tenden-
cies of the Serbian and Croatian society appe-
ared with equal intensity: in November 1998 the
signing by Alija IzetbegovicÕs government of an
agreement on Òspecial relationsÓ of the MCF and
Croatia continued to evoke protests among nu-
merous Bosnian groups, who saw in this a ÒCro-
atian partitionÓ11. Some experts tended to ascer-
tain that, in the face of Bosnian-Croat incidents
and the scale of centrifugal initiatives underta-
ken by Croatian nationalists from Herzegovina,
the real threat to Bosnia is Ònot the Republic of
Serbia but the Federation supported by the
USAÓ12. With the passing of time, the threat to
BosniaÕs unity was increasingly more commonly
seen, above all, in the existence of the Republic
of Serbia, due to two factors:
A. The singling-out of the RS in a constitutional
and territorial scope (Croatian cantons do not
form a close-knit whole within the sphere of the
MCF and there are no other quasi-administrative
legal structures that could unite Croats residing
in Bosnia).
B. The success in Croatia of the democratic and
pro-European orientation, as a result of which
its political elites have been rejecting any kind of
ÒrevisionismÓ with respect to Dayton since the
late 1990s. 
As a consequence, the last significant demon-
stration of a Òwill for distinctionÓ by Bosnian
Croats took place in early 2001, when attempts
were made to announce secession. In Serbia, ho-
wever, the democratic breakthrough was not
achieved until autumn 2000. In spite of this,
events that took place over the following years
(including the attack on SerbiaÕs prime minister
in March 2003) have shown the scope of influen-
ce maintained in Belgrade by circles associated
with the army and special forces, opposed to in-
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tegration with the West and the Dayton Agre-
ement. Centrifugal tendencies have also been di-
scussed in this analysis, following the example
of initiatives undertaken in the RS.
As a consequence of this, both sides disputing
BosniaÕs future (understood here as supporters
of a unitary state and [those supporting] the ma-
ximum autonomy of its constituents), declaring
an attachment to the Òconstitutional orderÓ and
the ÒDayton valuesÓ, remain in agreement with
the word of law; this status, however, does no-
thing to facilitate aspirations of reaching a com-
promise. 
Unitarianism vs. separatism
The demand for the ÒunitarisationÓ of Bosnia
(a process identified with its modernisation, de-
mocratisation, etc.) was raised by experts, as
well as by international politicians committed to
this sphere13. As time passes, it is also being ra-
ised, in an increasingly more resolute manner,
by Bosnian politicians. ÒUnless both entities of
Bosnia quickly institute significant reforms, the
Constitutional Tribunal of B&H should nullify
their constitutions,Ó ascertained Sejfudin Tokic14,
S p e a ker of the Upper House of Nations of
B&HÕsparliament in Sarajevo, in December 2001.
Even with regard to the urgent yearsÕ-long mat-
ter of unifying the armed forces, Bosnian politi-
cians are resolute, often justifying their position
in a rather demagogical manner: RS Vice Presi-
dent, Adil Osmanovic, representing the local Bo-
snian population, recently declared that ÒThe
RSÕs army is nothing more than one of Belgra-
deÕs subordinate formationsÓ15.
It is worth noticing, however, that there are do-
uble motives for these types of changes: Òratio-
nalÓ motives are exploited by politicians and fo-
reign experts, who focus attention on the enor-
mous costs and alarm as to the non-viability of
the operation of such a mechanism as the Bo-
snian state in its present shape. There are also
ÒsymbolicÓ motives usually referred to by Bo-
snian politicians and publicists16, who believe
that Òthe Serbian Republic [in its current form]
came into existence as the result of genocideÓ
and, therefore, its liquidation is absolutely ne-
cessary for moral reasons.
It is impossible to question the rational argu-
ment: the very fact of the existence, at times, of
a five-level decision-making structure (city Ð
canton Ð canton council Ð federation member Ð
federation as a whole) must influence the
growth in costs associated with running the co-
untry17, as does the support of a ÒdoubleÓ appa-
ratus of police, army and special forces (and,
until recently, border patrols), railway system
and municipal serv i c e s1 8. The unparalleled
growth of burocracy also favours a very high le-
vel of corruption and a paralysis in decision-ma-
king: presently Bosnia is incapable of leading an
independent economic existence19.
The Serbian Re p u b l i c Õ s opinion as a Ò p roduct of
genocideÓ (its supporters refer to the fact that
Serbian forces carried out ethnical cleansing on
a significant part of the territory and org a n i s e d
resettlements, which led to an obligatory ÒSerbi-
s a t i o nÓ), despite the existence of historical re-
asons justifying it, does not favour the building of
a consensus. It is not to be accepted by the Ser-
bian population of the RS2 0. The polarization of
opinions as concerns historical matters and at-
tempt to achieve Òhistorical justiceÓ, is also seen
as one follows the history of charges, submitted
by B&H authorities (the presidency) before the In-
ternational Tribunal in the Hague against Yu g o-
slavia. Serbian politicians in the central authori-
ties loyal to Banja Luka and Belgrade white wa-
shed themselves from these charges (in which
B & H authorities demand that Yugoslavia be held
responsible for war crimes carried out in
1991Ð1995 and be subject to high compensation).
One cannot doubt the impracticality and tempo-
rary character of the current state of affairs. Of
growing popularity among commentators is the
metaphor comparing the Serbian Republic in Bo-
snia to the German Democratic Republic; depen-
ding on the author, however, a solution to this
situation is seen in either the unification of Bo-
snia and Herzegovina or in Òuniting two Serbian
nationsÓ.
Most of the RSÕs politicians have resigned over
the past years from the (initially postulated) re-
visions of agreements with Dayton and declare
their support for maintaining these agreements
in their original form, acknowledging their in-
violability as the most certain protection against
unitarian postulations21. The deciding evidence
of just how popular are the ideas of the RSÕs
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right to the furthest possible degree of Òsepara-
tenessÓ [having its own, distinct characteristics]
within Bosnia is visible in the fact that, on the
RepublicÕs political scene, there are no groups
that would propagate unitarianist programmes.
It is also evident in the election defeats of those
who declared readiness in co-operating with
Croatian and Bosnian parties at a national level.
Also of significance is the emotional engage-
ment of the RSÕs Serbian citizens in favour of
this ÒseparatenessÓ22, as well as the existence of
semi-legal organisations propagating over the
Internet and in debit-free publishing houses the
idea of the RSÕs announcement of independence
or its unification with Serbia and Montenegro23.
Openness towards possible secession is evident
also in Art. 2 of the RSÕs Constitution (of 26 Sep-
tember 2001), which, even following the appro-
priate amendments imposed by the High Com-
m i s s i o n e r, reads: ÒAn understanding on the
change of borders between the RS and the MCF
may be ratified by way of a referendum among
the citizens of the RepublicÓ24 or the statement
made by former Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic,
who even during the pre-election campaign in
November 2001 declared the announcement of
independence by the RS25.
Among the measured propositions, worth no-
ting is the idea of one of SerbiaÕs most promi-
nent political scientists, Cedomir Antic, who de-
als with regional order in the Balkans and ÒSer-
bian geopoliticsÓ, and is associated with the gro-
ups ruling in Serbia. This postulation supports
the Òstrict integration of the economy, education
and culture of Serbia with the RSÓ, acknowled-
ging that this formula is admissible through the
agreement with Dayton and, simultaneously,
constitutes the only hope for the collapsing Ser-
bian enclave. Antic also focuses attention on the
RSÕs strategic (Òprotection against Islamic extre-
mism and terrorismÓ) and demographic role
(Òagainst the depopulation of Serbia, which can
be expected over the coming decadesÓ) for Bel-
grade26.
The internal contradiction 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
The internal division is written into Bo-
sniaÕs constitutional matter: it causes a lack of
functionality and, at the same time, itÕs unusual-
ly difficult to remove. Paradoxically, the govern-
ment system, which was designed with the idea
of conquering the causes and results of a bloody
ethnic conflict, forces the existance of ethnic ri-
fts or even strengthens them. The principle of
a proportional ethnic representation means that
any unethnical group interests (linked with pro-
fessions, trade and territory), which could favo-
ur the levelling of the divisions, appear to be se-
condary in the face of ethnic affiliations. ÒDay-
tonÓ Ð as noted recently by well-known Bosnian
intellectualist, Ivan Lovrenovic Ð Òis a political
device serving to maintain status quo [and not
the creation of a future]Ó27.
Government institutions and mechanisms for-
med with the idea of securing this state of affa-
irs and, as a result, consolidating the Òdivision in
twoÓ (alongside the actual ÒseparatenessÓ of the
stateÕs two constituents) include the following:
Ð subordination to the ethnic divisions of the
parliamentary representative system on a na-
tionwide level: in the Lower House (the House of
Representatives), as in the Higher House (the Ho-
use of Nations) there are separate Òrepresenta-
tionsÓ, i.e. groups of MPs (Serbian, Croat and Bo-
snian), the number of which is established up
front and who are chosen, accordingly, in a com-
mon vote or by the parliaments of both constitu-
ents. The ethnic composition of the MPs is also
significant during each election: the principle of
a majority of votes is not enough; it is also man-
datory to have a consensus of Òethnic represen-
tationsÓ28.
Ð the application of the Òproportional ethnic re-
presentationÓ principle to the selection of mem-
bers of certain central institutions, beginning
with the three-person ÒpresidencyÓ performing
the role of a Òjoint head of stateÓ, by the Consti-
tutional Tribunal, the Military Issues Committee
(a substitute for the federal defence department)
and the central bank. A longer dispute also took
place in 1999Ð2000 about the position of Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister):
initially, this position was transferred on a rota-
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tional basis (at weekly intervals) between three
Òvirtual prime ministersÓ representing the three
constitutional nations; eventually this period
was increased to six months. This principle also
binds on the lower levels of the state admini-
stration hierarchy Ð in such manner, for exam-
ple, two vice-ministers are obligated to repre-
sent two other Òconstitutional nationsÓ (if the
minister is Serbian, his substitutes are a Bosnian
and a Croat, etc.) Ð and it binds on both entities
of the B&H, as well as within legislative and exe-
cutive power structures.
Ð the veto mechanism, which plays a key role in
the legislative system (those with the right to ve-
to include national re p resentations in the federal
parliament, club leaders and, under specified
conditions, members of the presidency as well).
The intention of its designers was for this mecha-
nism to secure the rights of minorities and it ap-
pears to be fulfilling this task. Simultaneously,
h o w e v e r, as noted by Robert M. Hayden, the ve-
to mechanism serves well to protect thre a t e n e d
rights, yet it does not serve in reaching any kind
of compromise. In other words Ð as noted by this
analyst Ð ÒIt must be a surprising fact that the
deciding move, which is currently being expe-
rienced by Bosnia, is of exactly the same nature
as the one that led to its breakup in 1992. The
p roposed preventative mechanisms, there f o re ,
a re identical to those that authorities attempted
to apply in the former Yugoslav Fe d e r a t i o nÓ2 9. 
Directions of unification under-
taken by the High Commissioner
Among the most important and successful unifi-
cation initiatives of the High CommissionerÕs Of-
fice are, from among those cited above, the ap-
pointment of uniform border patrols for all of
Bosnia and the introduction of uniform identity
cards30. However, these reforms have failed to al-
ter the actual state of affairs being the profound
Òdivision in twoÓ of Bosnia.
The scale of divisions is evident in the lack of
success of subsequent measures intended to uni-
fy armed and special forces within Bosnia. Pres-
sure to move in this direction began in the late
1990s, when two military structures were for-
med on Bosnian territory: ÒVojska Federacije
BiHÓ active in the MCF and ÒVojska Republike
SrpskeÓ (VRS), differing with regard to weapons,
military principles, training procedures and for-
ming, in an obvious manner, a backup for revi-
sionist forces31. For the first time Carlos Westen-
dorp resolvedly demanded the integration of the
armed forces under a common leadership back
in February 199932. Appeals in this matter were
also directed repeatedly by SFOR leaders, inclu-
ding General John Sylvester (December 2001),
stressing that this is an absolute condition in Bo-
snia joining the ÒPartnership for PeaceÓ structu-
re and trying for membership in NATO. EU Com-
missioner Chris Patten spoke out in the same
spirit during his last visit to B&H (September
2002), as did General Secretary of NATO, George
Robertson (November 2002). An additional in-
centive (played off excellently through propa-
ganda) was the revelation by SFOR in spring this
year that VRS units carried out surveillance of
NATO armies and Western politicians 33. Bosnian
politicians recently joined in ÒunificationÓ at-
tempts, their main point of interest being the
stabilisation of Bosnia. Last August, the expan-
sion of the competencies of the Common Milita-
ry Issues Committee (a sub-organ of the collecti-
ve ÒpresidencyÓ constituting a substitute for the
federal Ministry of Defence) was supported by
Boris Belkic, a Bosnian member of the presiden-
cy34. SFOR Commander General William Ward ap-
pealed in this regard, for the last time, in May
this year, calling on leaders and Bosnian politi-
cians to speed up work on creating a common
army for both ÒentitiesÓ35. Such endeavours are
invariably faced with resistance from both enti-
ties and members of the potentially united for-
mations. The operation of such type of institu-
tion requires such a high degree of integration
that a ÒmockÓ, exhibitive and fictional integra-
tion would not achieve its intended goal.
WhatÕs more, it is highly probable that it would
lead to un-constitutional activities (the rise of
secret, ÒnationalÓ military and intelligence for-
mations).
Politicians of the Republic of Serbia have repe-
atedly acknowledged similar postulates as Òim-
permissibleÓ36. In recent years, Zivko Radisic
(a Serbian member of the presidency), former
president of the RS, Mirko Sarovic, or the Natio-
nal Defence Council heading the VRS have been
protesting against any types of initiatives aimed
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at unifying the armed forces, including Bel-
kicÕs initiative. The successive High Commissio-
ner, Paddy Ashdown has, thus far, taken the
most determined step by dissolving this last bo-
dy in early April; this step, in the short-term per-
spective, is more likely to lead to a growth in
anarchisation than to any real integration of ar-
med forces.
Perspectives for the 
development of the situation 
At present, three factors appear to be constant37:
1. the determination of the international com-
munity to unify and stabilise Bosnia; 
2. acceptance, by a decisive majority of residents
and political elites, of the intentions and initiati-
ves of this community as characterised above,
being a resultant of Òpassive resistanceÓ and op-
portunism, which may be labelled Òpolitical mi-
micry par excellenceÓ38;
3. the actual (and not only declared, as in the
first few years following Dayton) lack of interest
among new, democratic political elites appe-
aring in Croatia and in Serbia in changing of the
post-Dayton territorial status quo and the ack-
nowledgement in any Òstate-legalÓ form of the
ÒseparatenessÓ [autonomy] of the Serbian Repu-
blic in Bosnia or of Croatian cantons constituting
the MCF39. This is due to the risk of an absolute
and long-lasting break-up in relations with West
or the outright armed intervention thereof to
protect the Dayton Pact. 
In the foreseeable future, the first of these ele-
ments, namely the determination of the interna-
tional community, may prove to be the most su-
sceptible to change. Its leaders, as well as opi-
nion-forming circles, have repeatedly assured of
their intention to maintain and strengthen the
Dayton Peace Agreement, and the resoluteness
with which representatives of the community
opposed ÒcentrifugalÓ aspirations appear to be
evidence and a guarantee of this fact. At the sa-
me time, however, international public opinion
was constantly aware that this Agreement is an
attempt to bring into force a voluntary project,
a type of Òorder by choiceÓ, for which alternati-
ves exist Ð at least in theory.
Two elements, above all, may influence the we-
akening of the determination to maintain this
order (in the literal and metaphorical sense):
A. an evaluation of the costs (material, human
and political) borne thus far by the international
community (or its respective entities) and reco-
gnising that it cannot continue to offer stabilisa-
tion aid in the hitherto form; 
B. the appearance of new tasks or challenges,
which would force the community (or its respec-
tive entities) to dislocate forces and/or redistri-
bute re s o u rces to a d e g ree that would render im-
possible the fulfilment of its hitherto role in Bo-
snia, including what is most significant within
the context of this analysis Ð ÒcohesiveÓ (concen-
tric) activity through the strengthening of central
institutions and limiting of centrifugal forc e s .
It seems that presently, in summer 2003, the
above-cited perspective, though still within the
realm of possibility, is more likely now than at
any time over the past seven years40. The state-
ments of politicians and leading experts of We-
stern powers attest as to the rising concern in
the face of the necessity of constant military, fi-
nancial and political engagement in Bosnia41.
WhatÕs more, the opinion-forming circles of the
West, which cannot be suspected of sympathy
towards Serbian nationalism, have not entirely
rejected the concept of a ÒDayton revisionÓ (scil.
a division of Bosnia along ethnic border lines)42.
This is constituted by a series of factors: 
Ð poor results of almost all stabilisation initiatives
u n d e r t a ken (unification of the country, develop-
ment of democratic elites, privatisation of the eco-
nomy) and the high costs associated therewith; 
Ð the fact that the donor programme has already
absorbed almost USD 6 billion;
Ð the failure of the privatisation programme in
a situation where the progressive decapitalisa-
tion of companies intended for this purpose ren-
ders it less profitable and less possible to execu-
te from year to year.
Simultaneously, the attack of 11 September 2001
caused a resolute transfer of US priorities with
regard to goals for building national protection,
as well as directions of engagement. Despite the
fact that a considerable part of the USÕs Europe-
an allies distanced themselves, to a greater or
lesser degree, from this over-evaluation (an
expressive example of this has been the contro-
versy surrounding US intervention in Iraq in
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spring this year), it cannot be ruled out that, in
the case of continuing terrorist activities by the
al-Qaida also within Europe, European countries
wouldnÕt react in a similar manner. Even if this
were not to occur, the ability and determination
of Western European NATO members or EU sta-
tes to independently stabilise BosniaÕs military
and economic situation might falter.
Additional variables that should be taken into
account when considering the perspectives for
preserving BosniaÕs integrity include: 
Ð a constant improvement in the economic situ -
ation (the development of infrastructure and the
free-market economy, a fall in unemployment) in
Bosnia and neighbouring countries;
Ð a calendar and dynamics of expanding EU
structures to the Western Balkans;
Ð BosniaÕs demographic situation.
Three basic directions of the development of the
situation may be outlined, with respect to the
above, without deciding in advance what their
detailed development should look like: 
A. ÒOptimisticÓ: the international community
finds resources enabling it to continue its stabi-
lisation activities in Bosnia, including the mo-
dernisation of the economy and the construc-
tion of the stateÕs central structures. Simultane-
ously, democratisation processes are taking pla-
ce in neighbouring countries (Serbia, Croatia), as
well as the expansion of EU and NATO structures
to the Western Balkans and, as a consequence Ð
the opening of the borders between countries in
the region and the involvement of the re-
gionÕs citizens, on a previously incomparable
scale, in the Europe-wide circulation of goods
and resources. 
In this situation one can hope that the older ge-
neration of Bosnian residents and politicians
would realise the anachronism of the hitherto
division and the occurrence of a gradual loss of
the significance of the former determinants of
the collective identity for the younger genera-
tion43. In the optimum variant, the Òinter-Bo-
snianÓ border could recall, for example, the bor-
der between the Flemish and Walonian commu-
nes in Belgium or between the various cantons
of Switzerland. They would actually divide socie-
ties belonging to different ethnic backgrounds
and regions with a separate historical identity.
At the same time, however, they would constitu-
te a relic with practically no significance to the
daily operation of the state. In these circumstan-
ces it would also be possible to change the con-
tent of the Dayton constitution44. Such a scena-
rio is also spoken for by a growth in the number
of people returning to their former place of resi-
dence, which means that the RS and MCF are be-
coming Òless monoethnicÓ.
B. ÒPessimisticÓ, which may be accomplished
through one or several destabilising factors: the
resignation of the international community
from conducting the stabilisation mission in Bo-
snia, the failure of economic and political re-
forms in the region, the break-up of the process
of expanding the EU and NATO to the Western
Balkans, a demographic boom in Bosnia, etc.
A situation of weakening cohesive forces and at-
tractive incentives in the form of a speedy per-
spective of EU membership and an improvement
in living standards would lead to the activation
of groups supporting maximum federalisation
or the division of the Bosnian nation.
The increase of inter-ethnic tensions (Serbo-Bo-
snian, Serbo-Croatian), which it is impossible to
rule out in such situation, would lead to the mo-
bilisation of public opinion in ÒmotherÓ states,
the activation and rise of popularity of presently
marginalised groups, demanding the revision of
the agreement with Dayton and the annexation
of Òhistorically Serbian/Croatian landsÓ45. In the
best-case scenario, they would contribute to the
unsettlement of the stable political situation in
these countries, in the worst case Ð to attempts
at an open ÒincorporationÓ of Bosnian lands. Bo-
sniaÕs experience in this case would comply with
that of Cyprus, the South Caucasus (the Kara-
bach region) or Lebanon: the ÒfreezingÓ of con-
flicts and ethnic divisions mostly does nothing to
p rotect against the opening of old lines of divi-
sion the instant the control system is weake n e d .
Such tensions might eventually lead to the
g rowth of the above mentioned negative tenden-
cies, beginning from illegal transit of people and
materials, ending up with making Bosnia the cor-
nerstone for the radical Islamism in Euro p e .
C. The intermediate variant linking the condi-
tions and consequences of both of the above-ci-
ted variants is also probable: the progressive au-
tonomisation of Bosnia and movement of its
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constituents (in particular the RS) in the direc-
tion of the Òmother statesÓ, taking place with
the permission or even support of the West. Spe-
aking out against this scenario is the fact that it
would be linked with the prestigious defeat of
the West, which would be forced to acknowled-
ge the failure of its earlier plans. However, given
the change in priorities cited above, it would be
impossible to rule out such solution. In recent
months many experts and publicists have sup-
ported such solution (which was hitherto taboo):
next to the already quoted William Pfaff, particu-
lar attention should be paid to the analysis pre-
pared by A. Ross Johnson, an expert of the Wo-
odrow Wilson International Center, which sum-
marises the ten-year experience of stabilisation
efforts in the Balkans46. Johnson notes a lack of
the expected breakthrough in relations between
the nations that were previously in conflict and
a growing disproportion between the costs asso-
ciated with maintaining Balkan ÒprotectoratesÓ
and the possibilities of the international com-
munity. In his contemplations of Bosnia, Johnson
supports the acceptance of one of two variants:
strengthening the basic functions of the central
government in Sarajevo (the defence system and
foreign policy) with the simultaneous Òdelega-
tionÓ of the remaining spheres to the benefit of
both entities or Ð in the face of a lack of threat,
which was the annexation of the RS and Cro-
atian cantons to the Òmother statesÓ in 1995 Ð
the relinquishment of costly unification efforts
and expressing agreement for the furthest ad-
vanced autonomy even if it were to lead to the
formal declaration of independence. 
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